The route of the expedition

One of the most perplexing decisions taken about the expedition to rescue Emin Pasha is why Stanley routed it via Zanzibar and South Africa before steaming up the Congo River and across 400 miles of unexplored jungle.  Emin and Stanley eventually met near Kavalli’s village on 29 April 1888 and as can be seen from Map 3, the decision added over 6,000 miles to an itinerary that had not only been agreed and costed, but was in an advanced stage of preparation to cross East Africa.  Nobody – Stanley included – has ever managed to make much sense of it and the explanation offered up in his book "In Darkest Africa" defies all logic. 

Of all the people involved in the planning to rescue Emin, Stanley should have had the clearest idea why the last minute change was made, but all he did was to shift the responsibility onto King Leopold, writing that the King was only prepared to release him from his contractual obligations if the expedition switched from its intended route through East Africa.  The King himself never explained this last-minute intervention and Stanley claimed not to understand his thinking, but it was this early planning decision that would impact more than any other on the failures of the EPRE, so it is crucial to understand why it was made.

If Stanley was the only person to offer any sort of explanation, and if that explanation was one which he claimed not to understand anyway, then it is quite bizarre that historians, biographers and academics should have simply nodded it through without considering the obvious - that he was once again lying, motivated by a determination to conceal his own lack of judgment and shocking failures of management.   Evidence for this is contained in Foreign Office papers and in the correspondence relating to Stanley's legal dispute with the booking agent who arranged his English speaking engagements.

1890 map
This was the result of the Treaty between England and Germany in 1890 which ceded control over Zanzibar and much of East Africa to the British in exchange for the small island of Heligoland which controlled German naval access to the North Sea and Atlantic. 

 

We first need to put the expedition into the context of European interest in tropical Africa.  By the second half of the 19th century explorers had penetrated the heart of the continent and were being followed by adventurers and opportunists from all corners of Europe who were focussed on exploiting the region’s commercial potential.  This was highly speculative, because  the only real wealth to come out of the interior for the previous thousand years was ivory, which was being brought out on the heads of slaves captured by Arab traders operating out of Zanzibar. 

Abolition of the slave trade was without any doubt the driving moral crusade of the 19th century and although there was a genuine humanitarian determination to bring it to an end throughout Africa, the argument was being stretched to justify a European presence in tropical Africa  and the exploitation of the continent's natural resources[1], but for explorers, missionaries and carpetbaggers alike, the biggest obstacle was getting access to the region.

It was the steam engine which drove 19th century empire building.  Not only did it bring about an industrial revolution in manufacturing, but it also enabled vast areas of the world to be opened up and connected.  Steam powered paddle-boats had been navigating long rivers and steam trains puffing across the landscape in Europe and America for decades, but tropical Africa presented a fresh set of challenges.  There are no big rivers in East Africa, which was why the interior was so slow to be mapped by explorers who were having to carry their supplies and equipment on the heads of hundreds of porters over the some of most challenging terrain on earth.

William MacKinnon was a deeply religious ship-owner who wanted to use his wealth to benefit the people of Africa.  For many years he dreamed of being able to access central Africa by train, but the construction of a railway involved a financial commitment far beyond the reach of most private speculators, so he focussed on lobbying the Government to invest in a railway line inland from the East coast of Africa up to Lake Victoria.  For a brief period he had been persuaded by Henry Morton Stanley, who had spent years in the service of King Leopold, to consider the potential of using the vast Congo River system to travel a thousand easy miles into the centre of the continent, but there was an impediment in the form of a series of rapids about sixty miles from the mouth of the river that acted as a barrier to navigation.

He, Stanley and Stanley's successor as Administrator for the Congo State Sir Francis de Winton, spent a frustrating amount of time and effort trying to persuade King Leopold to grant them the concession to build a railway around the rapids, but after failing to make much progress with the enigmatic and sphinx-like King, MacKinnon turned his back on a west coast approach and by 1885 had firmly refocused his attention on East Africa.  As far as he was concerned, if it was going to be necessary to built a railway whether he went east or west towards the centre of the continent, he favoured the open savannah route over the jungle one. Notwithstanding his personal vision, he always found it hard to get politicians or investors interested because the commercial prospects did not begin to justify the huge investment necessary to access the region, much of which was still completely unexplored[2].  It was one thing for explorers  and missionaries to talk up the prospects, but none of them were economic realists who understood the importance of turning a profit.

What MacKinnon needed was a project that would capture public imagination and shift the focus of the political debate, so when news that Emin Bey[3], one of Egypt’s provincial administrators, was trapped in his province of Equatoria, MacKinnon spotted his opportunity.  He hoped that by applying pressure on the Government to endorse a mission to rescue Emin, he might be able to focus public awareness on the importance of suppressing the slave traffic in central Africa.

The British Government's attention had been distracted by having to calm down popular calls to avenge the murder of the British missionary Hannington in Uganda, but in September 1886, after increasingly urgent reports from Lake Victoria, politicians seemed to be slightly more amenable to the idea of coming to Emin's aid[4].  Stanley  was desperate to lead the rescue attempt, sensing that it would be a golden opportunity to cement his reputation as Africa’s greatest ever explorer by being the first white man to open up a route between the Nile and the Congo rivers.  It was certainly far more exciting and potentially remunerative than being an administrative functionary of the Congo State.

Henry Morton Stanley is no longer celebrated as a white hero of Africa except by a handful of die-hard fans, and the little that is remembered about his last, terrible expedition is based on his own best-selling account[5], written in anticipation of criticisms threatening to engulf him in 1890.  By then he needed the world to believe that he had led a successful humanitarian mission to rescue a distinguished man who had become surrounded by enemies in central Africa, but the narrative is astonishingly unreliable[6].  Although he promised his chief sponsor MacKinnon that it would be “…a truthful record of the journeyings of the Expedition which you and the Emin Relief Committee entrusted to my guidance…”, too few people noticed that when “In Darkest Africa” was published, he added an important proviso “What the public ought to know, that I have written; but there are many things that the snarling, cynical, unbelieving, vulgar ought not to know.[7]  With this clue, readers – and certainly subsequent commentators – should have been alerted to the fact that he was suppressing the truth, but curiously, very few people have ever bothered to fact-check his assertions.

It ought to have been obvious that only somebody with a great deal to hide would need to lie so consistently about the expedition, but nobody seems to have appreciated the extent to which Stanley was determined to mislead everybody about its planning, purpose and progress – kicking off his account with the false suggestion that the disastrous decision to reach central Africa via the Congo River was forced on the EPRE Committee by King Leopold[8]

Expedition Route
Map 3 - Troup went directly to the Congo but Stanley and his other officers made their own ways to Africa, meeting up at a redezvous in Egypt.  From there they travelled together via the Suez Canal to Zanzibar, where they picked up Tippu Tib, his retinue of 80 wives, personal slaves and family as well as the 600 slave porters recruited by MacKinnon's agent before sailing around Cape Horn and up the west coast of Africa to the mouth of the Congo.   They knew Emin to be located somewhere just to the North of the Equator (marked deep pink on my map).   It was the stretch between Yambuya and Kavalli's village that Stanley was determined to pioneer.

Stanley claimed in his book that

It was only in October 1886 that MacKinnon had spoken to him about the possibility of conveying relief to Emin with a view to his holding his own in Equatoria[9] -

  • They discussed four possible routes to reach him, three from the East Coast of Africa and one by travelling up the Congo with a steamer pulling a flotilla of whaleboats.  Stanley believed the latter would be the least expensive, but he told MacKinnon that it would require sanction of King Leopold[10].
  • While on a lecture tour in America, he received a telegram from MacKinnon “Your plan and offer accepted” to which he immediately replied that he was on his way and that the authorities in Zanzibar should start preparations[11].
  • When he got back to England, he tried to argue for the Congo route he favoured, but when faced with opposition from the EPRE Committee gave way, despite believing that he would spend too much of his time fighting natives through East Africa[12].     
  • It was only on 7 January 1887, when preparations for a Zanzibar start were in full swing, that a letter was received from Brussels advising that “The Congo State has nothing to gain by the Expedition for the relief of Emin Pasha passing through its territory.  The King has suggested this road merely so as to lend your services to the Expedition, which it would be impossible for him to do were the Expedition to proceed by the Eastern coast."[13].

Taken together, these assertions were fraudulent and hid the real reason why there was a last minute change of route.

1885 and 1886 had been wilderness years for the explorer.  After stepping back from his role of Administrator General of the Congo State, he had remained under a vague contractual obligation to King Leopold but had been kept dangling, unsure if, when or in what capacity he might be called upon to perform[14].  Truth to tell he was not cut out to be an administrator.  He was first and foremost a journalist for whom "Africa" was his specialist subject, not just the backdrop for the drama of his life, but the bread and butter of the lecture tours he undertook for the fame and fortune it brought him. 

He maintained a close line of communication with MacKinnon and by mid-November 1886 the two men had reached an in-principle agreement that he would lead an expedition across East Africa to rescue Emin if the costs – which he undertook would amount to no more than £20,000 - could be raised.  Although he was a rich man, this was a substantial sum for MacKinnon to bear personally and he continued to pester the British Government to sponsor the rescue mission[15] while Stanley embarked on a lecture tour around England.

Lecturing was a lucrative business for a popular speaker and Stanley employed a booking agent to negotiate fees on his behalf with venues around the country.  His English agent was Mr Appleton who  did a tolerably good job, but Stanley wanted to get back into the American market where there was a huge demand for such entertainments and it seemed, better money available.  Major J B Pond was the world’s most successful booking agent and since he happened to be in England drumming up business, Appleton offered to make an introduction[16].

The two Americans hit it off instantly. Stanley agreed to do a series of 50 lectures for a fixed fee of $100 each plus expenses and Pond promised to whip up public interest with an aggressive marketing campaign.  On 25 August 1886 their agreement was confirmed in a letter which contained an important proviso - “It is expressly understood that should any letter or telegram be received from the King of the Belgians or in his name (my underlining) requiring my presence or services, this engagement of lectures shall then be cancelled at whatever cost or pecuniary loss to you and that I shall be allowed to default without demur on your part or demand of any kind.  À propos of this last clause I may mention that I hold the King’s First Secretaries letter wherein I can perceive no likelihood of being required soon – nevertheless there is always a possibility and to prevent future annoyance it is prudent to bear the risk in mind.”[17]

King Leopold
King Leopold II of the Belgians

It was sensible for Stanley to warn Pond about his old arrangement with King Leopold even though he had not been called upon to do anything in his service for some time and there was no prospect in the offing [18].  Indeed, for the previous two years Stanley had been writing of his frustration and belief that the Belgian authorities were just waiting for the opportunity to sack him [19].  Once he had signed up with Pond, Stanley told Appleton that he would pay him a commission of 10% of the fees generated from the tour for having procured the introduction.

After a hasty visit to Belgium to be reassured that the King really did not have any immediate plans for him, he set sail for America[20].  His lecture tour started slowly, but thanks to a very effective promotional campaign, word got around and by his third lecture he found himself in great demand and speaking to sell-out audiences.  Pond was thrilled, although Stanley would certainly have felt that the agreement was not operating to his financial advantage.   He was delivering his 11th lecture when he was handed a telegram from MacKinnon - “Your plan and offer accepted. Authority approved. Funds provided. Business urgent. Come Promptly. Reply – MacKinnon[21] and he immediately brought the lecture tour to an end, informing Pond curtly that “Must stop lecturing. Recalled.”[22]

What he failed to explain to Pond was that it was not King Leopold who had recalled him, and the agent simply assumed that the get-out clause was being properly exercised.  Pond tried to persuade Stanley to return to America by offering to double his fees, but events were moving too fast, and he had to resign himself to a huge loss of revenue [23].    Stanley, who was no stranger to litigation, was well aware he might sue.  According to Pond, they parted on 14 December with a handshake and the confirmation that “I owe you eighty-nine lectures which I will deliver if ever I return from Africa[24]

Although Stanley had agreed with MacKinnon that he would lead the EPRE across East Africa, he had never been so keen on the route that he would have been prepared to give up substantial earnings in America and compromise his relationship with Leopold, but the idea of doing something newsworthy in the unknown regions of central Africa had become an obsession and he was determined to impose his will on MacKinnon[25].  Just days before signing up with Pond, Stanley had written of his hope that King Leopold might allow him to develop the Upper Congo River - “His Majesty could utilise my services by giving me an exploring mission North, North East or East.  Possibly something that would be advantageous to the State could be found, at least the boundaries North, North East and East would be located.  It is a great region and resources of some value and utility ought to be discovered…[26].  One thing is certain - he never saw himself as a mere delivery service for relief supplies – the glory did not lie in travelling across one of the relatively well trailed East African routes, but in being the pioneer of the unexplored route from the Congo to the Nile[27].

He was also running out of material for his lectures, not having done any real exploring since his famous transcontinental journey of 1877.  The event for which he was still most famous was the discovery of David Livingstone on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, but that was 15 years earlier and he had nothing new to say about it.  True, he had spent years in the service of King Leopold building stations along the Congo, but popular audiences wanted tales of adventure, not lectures on the empire-building machinations of the countries involved in the scramble for Africa.   Only the prospect of leading an expedition through the last unexplored wilderness in Africa was guaranteed to increase his fame and enhance his prospects on the lecture circuit, but since MacKinnon strongly objected to his preferred route, he had find ways to get others to make the argument for him.  Through his long association with King Leopold, Stanley had the ear of fellow journalists in Belgium and it was in the Belgian press that his argument in favour using the Congo to reach Emin was first aired[28].

Stanley thought he would be able to enlist Government support  against MacKinnon and when he arrived back in England from America, the very first thing he did was to arrange to meet Sir Percy Anderson whose brief at the Foreign Office was focussed mainly on the suppression of the slave trade in Africa.  It is a measure of his determination to sway the argument in favour of  his preferred Congo route that he travelled all the way down to Anderson’s country home in Maidenhead to discuss his proposal.  He had to do so without raising alarm, given that MacKinnon had budgeted and was already busy preparing for an expedition that would cross East Africa, so he asked Anderson to keep his idea secret[29].  The Government was reluctant to get drawn into the detail of what was already viewed as a high-risk expedition and Stanley was left pinning his hopes on being able to persuade MacKinnon's close knit group of family and friends round to his preference.  He attended the first meeting of the EPRE Committee on 29 December 1886 and re-argued the case for the Congo route but unhappily for him, MacKinnon now had additional support from his co-investors and his original reticence had if anything become an even firmer opposition.

Stanley appeared to allowed the committee to think he was backing down gracefully in the face of the unanimous view that the expedition should be a relatively low-key, low risk journey across East Africa and the meeting merely records the first steps being taken to prepare for a departure from Zanzibar[30].  He remained resolutely determined to get his own way and the agreement with Pond now gave him an added cause for concern – if Emin was to be rescued via East Africa, then there was no obvious reason for King Leopold to be involved in an expedition which was never going to touch his territory.  If Pond had realised that it was not the King who had recalled the explorer from America he might have concluded that Stanley was in breach of their agreement and sued. 

Time was running out if he wanted to  exert influence over the choice of route and within hours of that first committee meeting, Stanley left for another audience with King Leopold in Brussels, travelling secretly by overnight train and ferry.  It has been assumed, but only because Stanley subsequently told everybody it was so, that this meeting was called at the King’s request on hearing that Stanley had been asked to lead the expedition, but in his private journal he explains that he went to Brussels to ask for permission to travel through the Congo.  Both explanations cannot be true at the same time, so which was it? 

One way or another, Stanley was being dishonest.  The committee had just confirmed that the expedition would go through East Africa, so Leopold's permission to travel through the Congo was never needed, which begs the question - why did Stanley even bother to advance this version of events in a private journal that would never be made public?  If the reason for travel was however true and Stanley was indeed seeking permission to travel up the Congo, he must have been planning to override the committee's decision even before it was made. 

It was apparently an emotional meeting.  Stanley had been tremendously upset that Leopold had kept him hanging about for so long and claims to have made his views known.  According to him, the King casually brushed his hurt feelings aside, blaming high level political issues which Stanley guessed might have something to do with the French, by whom he was despised[31].   He claimed to have no idea why Leopold was so keen to lay claim to his services “I soon learned that the King, far from objecting to the Expedition going through his State, was really anxious that the Committee would change its plans and allow it to go up the Congo, and after a little time said “If the Committee will not agree to this I do not see how I can lend your services – which are as you know pledged to me – for this Expedition.  I shall want you myself in a few weeks from now, on a far more important work than the relief of Emin Bey.  It is a mission of which you might well be proud – but if the Committee will let you go by the Congo I can postpone the mission for another 18 months” … However, the King is obstinate and says it must be so or the Committee must choose another leader for the expedition.  The King is a clever and far-seeing man and I suppose he foresees some benefit accruing to the Congo by the passage of the Expedition through the State, but I confess I do not see it…[32]

It was of course a charade - Leopold never did explain what mission he had in mind that was so much more important than rescuing Emin and we can be sure there was no compelling reason for him to demand Stanley’s services.  It was after all, merely weeks since he had given him permission to go on an extended lecture tour of America.   The only logical explanation for his last-minute support for Stanley’s route is that the explorer had made him feel guilty for years of inaction and asked him to persuade MacKinnon to change his mind as a personal favour.  The King duly obliged, and wrote to MacKinnon who informed Stanley that he had just received “… a pleasant short letter from the King showing how anxious he is the Congo route should be taken and how unwilling to allow a break in the continuity of your connection with the Congo State as he considers you a fellow Counsellor of the State.  He asks me to remove any divergent sentiments and get all partners to agree to the Congo route.”[33]

MacKinnon explained to the King’s secretary that the plans for the expedition were far too far advanced to allow for last minute disruption of this magnitude, but Stanley was not finished.  He assured his sponsor that it was easy enough to make switch of route provided that they could get assistance from the British Government to carry the expedition from Zanzibar to the Congo as well as free transport up the river and he prevailed upon Leopold to be more emphatic in his support.  MacKinnon still had great misgivings, but felt he had no option but to comply with the King’s renewed demand “It is a great pity the King has intervened so late (he also urges the impossibility of his consenting to your being absent 12, 14 or possibly 18 months and the Congo State losing control of your services for so long a period) and he adds he foresees he shall very soon entrust you with an important Mission.   He says the Congo State has nothing to gain by the Expedition taking that route but that he wishes it because he would thereby be enabled to lend you to the expedition which would be impossible for him to do it if you went by EC land route.”[34]

Stanley kept quiet about his meeting on 30 December and failed to mention either it or the King’s apparent reluctance to release him from his contract to MacKinnon or the EPRE Committee.  He continued to give every impression that he was still preparing for an East African expedition[35] although he was already secretly altering his plans.  One of the men Stanley recruited for the expedition was J Rose Troup who had worked for years on the Congo River in a logistics role with Leopold’s State enterprise.  Apparently, he told Troup that his logistics experience on the river was ideal for an expedition that at stage was still being prepared for a crossing  of the riverless plains of East Africa[36].  

On 15 January 1887 Stanley was back in Belgium, and it was probably at this meeting that the conspiracy was finalised[37].  The explorer would get his way over the route of the expedition and by graciously agreeing to release Stanley from his contract and lend the transport resources of the Congo State, Leopold was able to assume a pivotal role in an international adventure which would otherwise have completely passed him by.  Stanley was also quick to point out another advantage to the King who  was still rumbling with fury that Congo State’s most remote station at Stanley Falls had fallen to ivory and slave trader Tippu Tib's family in early 1886 and wanted to bring it back under his control.   The explorer played a masterstroke, confiding to the King that he was already planning to ask Tippu Tib to supply extra porterage once he arrived at Stanley Falls and he boldly suggested that Leopold would be able to secure control of his old station if he was prepared to negotiate a wider arrangement with the slave trader and offer him as salaried position as Governor of Stanley Falls if he undertook to hold it on behalf of the Congo State[38].  

During their discussions, Stanley learned that the King was now flirting with the idea of persuading Emin to stay in Equatoria as Governor of an extension to his Congo State.  This would have been another kick in the teeth for MacKinnon who had asked Stanley to persuade Emin to help develop his East African ambitions[39], but to keep Leopold on side for his Congo route Stanley promised, with fingers firmly crossed behind his back, to put the King’s offer to Emin, even though he had the foresight to say that he thought it unlikely to be accepted[40].

As it happened, even if he had known that it was MacKinnon rather than King Leopold who had recalled Stanley to Europe, Major Pond was unlikely to have pursued a claim for breach of contract.  He was first and foremost a commercial operator and it was not in his interests to fall out with the most famous man in the world and perhaps lose the rights to his lecture tours on his return from Africa – no doubt with his reputation significantly enhanced and with a new stock of stories to tell.  However, for his English agent Appleton, Stanley’s recall by MacKinnon had a less happy outcome.  Even though he continued to act as Stanley’s English booking agent after the expedition, Pond constantly sniped at the arrangements he was making and pushed for Stanley to use his own services[41].

Appleton was at the time in severe financial difficulties, reduced to chiselling the owners of the venues over the box office receipts and begging MacKinnon and others to lend him money.  The problem was that Stanley was tighfisted, and demanded more for his English lectures than receipts could sustain [42] and the agent found himself caught up in conflicting commercial realities.   There were middlemen between agent and the lecture venues and one of them - Mr Pewtress - had paid Appleton an advance of £200 so when there was a shortfall on the receipts, he demanded his money back.  Since Appleton could not pay him, he sued Stanley for the return of his cash[43]

Stanley lecturing
Stanley lecturing

Stanley was furious to learn that he was being held responsible for his agent’s actions[44]and he tried unsuccessfully to persuade his lawyers to say that the money in Appleton’s hands was a personal loan.  This was obviously not true and Stanley was advised that he had no defence to the claim[45].  He therefore paid £150 to settle with Pewtress and undertook to give evidence against his now former agent[46].  With nothing to lose, Appleton pursued his own claim against Stanley for breach of the commission agreement, demanding not merely his percentage of receipts from the truncated 1886 American tour, but on all the money Stanley would have earned through Pond had it not been brought to an abrupt end.  He went even further, asserting he was in effect a party to the Pond/Stanley agreement and entitled to a percentage of the money earned under all of Stanley’s contractual arrangements made in America after the expedition was over[47].

Stanley was absolutely flabbergasted.  Although it was perfectly clear from what he had written in IDA, that in December 1886 he had been responding to MacKinnon’s recall to Europe, he set about defending the action on the basis that he was fulfilling an obligation owed to King Leopold within the meaning of the proviso to his agreement with Pond.  As he explained to his lawyers after the event

As I was about to deliver the 11th lecture I was recalled by Sir William MacKinnon for the Relief of Emin Pasha.  The King of the Belgians gave me two commissions relating to Tippoo Tib and Stanley Falls Station.”[48]

His lawyers would have noticed that no connection was made between the recall and the undefined commissions.  Stanley’s explanation to his lawyers fell short in other respects too - the King would have had no interest in the arrangement relating to porterage and if he was referring to the agreement offering Tippu Tib the Governorship of Stanley Falls, then according to Stanley, it was he rather than Leopold who had come up with the idea of reaching an accommodation with the slave trader.   One thing was sure – the task of engaging with Tippu Tib in negotiations did not “require” Stanley to take the whole EPRE via the Congo River since the expedition was already being prepared for a departure from Zanzibar, where Tippu Tib lived and any negotiations would naturally and, in the event did, take place.

Had Leopold genuinely needed Stanley personally to conduct negotiations over the Governorship of Stanley Falls, then both men must have realised that if Tippu Tib had refused the offer, there would have been no purpose served sending the expedition by way of the Congo.  The explanation Stanley gave to his lawyers was  an ex post facto excuse to avoid the consequences of Appleton’s claim for breach of contract, but it was not his only  attempt to explain away the sequence of events.

Litigation is a process, requiring both parties to set out their case in very legalistic formal pleadings, then to disclose the documentary evidence on which they rely before the dispute gets anywhere near a court, which is where witnesses are cross examined and the matter is decided.  Little has changed from that basic structure in the last 100 years, although juries (in the UK at least) now have no role in deciding civil disputes and technology has had a dramatic impact on the preparation for trial.  Time spent in court has always been the most expensive part of the process and strenuous efforts were made to settle cases before they get that far, but getting bogged down in procedural game-play ran absolutely contrary to Stanley’s fighting instincts.

His preference was to battle out every dispute on his own terms, rather than be pinned down by rules and legalistic interpretations which inhibited his ability to dominate an argument by sheer force of personality or by twisting the facts.   Lawyers had an annoying tendency to focus on and expose his more egregious falsehoods which he found highly inconvenient, preferring to fight his battles in the familiar surroundings of the press media where he could present his own “truth” without being humiliated by an expert advocate and perhaps even risking a perjury conviction. 

But now he was tied into court process, he needed evidence to prove the case he had advanced in his defence - that it was the King who had demanded his return to Europe to head up the EPRE.  Naturally he asked his friends for help.  The Belgian official Bourchgrave informed him that he had the King’s authority to say “…that you were recalled from America with the King’s assent – that his English and Belgian enterprises in Central Africa were in the habit of helping each other – that the King called you to Brussels before you started in search of Emin and that HM gave you instructions and entrusted you with an offer to Emin and his people.”[49]

The problem was easy enough for lawyers to spot.  Stanley had told them that the King had recalled him to carry out unspecified commissions in relation to Tippu Tib, but here was Bourchgrave, on behalf of the King, suggesting that he was recalled so that he could put an offer to Emin, which is doubly strange, because the urgent mission for which Leopold wanted Stanley had apparently been "...a far more important work than the relief of Emin Bey".  

It was an explanation which would have opened a fruitful line in cross examination at trial, making no more sense than Stanley’s original account and still failing to explain why Leopold demanded that the EPRE had to travel through the Congo to put the offer.  More to the point, it would have exposed Stanley’s conflict of interest with MacKinnon and the scheme which had already been given the nod of approval by the British, Egyptian and Zanzibari authorities. 

HMS
Stanley in the Safari hat and jacket
that he had made to his own design

Perhaps the most revealing thing to emerge from the litigation papers was that nearly 7 years after the events which led to the formation of the rescue mission, none of the principals involved appeared to have any clear idea why Leopold had been so insistent that Stanley travel through his private African estate to reach Emin.  When the expedition turned into a disaster the King was less keen to be associated with it but had there been any logic behind his original decision, it should not have been difficult to explain on oath after the event[50]

Stanley’s lawyers understood the risks far better than he did and urged him to settle the action, but he found it difficult to accept unpalatable advice and exploded with anger and frustration.  Appleton was also desperate to avoid a trial – not because he had much risk of losing the case, but because he did not have the money to sustain his lawyers along the way.  His solution was to put pressure on Stanley through the expedition’s sponsor MacKinnon, writing to the old man “As the hearing of my action against Mr Stanley is now within a measurable distance and his defence if persisted in will result in your name and that of the King of the Belgians into officious prominence in the matter…I know you would not wish to be associated with an act of deception on the part of Mr Stanley and I am equally sure His Majesty would be annoyed at having his name dragged into a Court of Justice in connection with a case such as this…[51].

He suggested a meeting, explaining his position with precision “…Mr Stanley brought you into the case in the following way: -

- Clause 4 of my contract with him (August 1886) reads viz ‘That it is expressly understood that should any letter or telegram be received from the King of the Belgians or in his name requiring my presence or services this engagement to lecture shall be cancelled at whatever cost or pecuniary loss to you…’

- On 11 December 86 you cabled Mr Stanley…Now Mr Stanley’s contention is that this cablegram was sent by order of the King of the Belgians – you being simply His Majesties “agent” in the matter – that in consequence our contract was at an end and he was free to enter into any other contract he pleased.

- Clause 4 of his defence reads ‘The Defendant says he was recalled by the King of the Belgians within the meaning of the said agreement.’

- Now I had Lord Iddlesleigh’s personal assurance that you alone were the promoter of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition and that the King had absolutely nothing to do with it. 

- I had the same assurance at the Belgian Embassy and the official correspondence printed and submitted to Parliament in December 1888 (Africa No 8 – 1888 – C – 5601) is an ample confirmation were it needed of what has now become historical fact.  What I am now required to establish according to forms and methods is that you were not directed or asked by the King of the Belgians to send to Mr Stanley your cablegram of Dec 11 1886…[52]

MacKinnon was in the final stages of a terminal illness, with neither the energy or inclination to deal with yet another controversy and he passed the letter to Stanley, who simply ignored it.  Appleton wrote again to suggest that lawyers could meet if he did not want to do so in person, but MacKinnon was too ill even to give them instructions.   The final straw landed when he was served with a subpoena requiring him to give evidence at the trial – the anxiety of having to confront the consequences of yet more of Stanley’s lies probably added to the stresses that killed him[53].

The litigation settled at the door of the court, as these things often are.  Stanley agreed to pay Appleton £250, rather less than he might have had to pay had he persisted in the lie about King Leopold’s determination to force the expedition up the Congo River, but still enough for his lawyer to have to soothe his anger at the cost of the exercise[54].  Ever one to push his luck, Stanley instructed the lawyer to apply to the Royal Bounty Fund for assistance with his costs before it was pointed out to him that the Fund was only for those without the means to pay for legal representation and that by the standards of the day Stanley was a tolerably wealthy man[55].

By the time the litigation came to an end in October 1893, the world was no longer interested in the conduct or consequences of the expedition.  All the participants had had their say and their disagreements lay on the table unresolved, largely because no forensic examination of the evidence was ever undertaken.  If you were in the Stanley camp, nothing would have convinced you that it had been anything but a magnificent success and if you had long held the view that Stanley was a fraudulent parvenu, you could safely continue to believe it.

Text © Marcus Rutherford 2024.  Engraving of King Leopold from “The Pictorial Edition of the Life and Discoveries of David Livingston” c.1876 

 

[1] The British were extraordinarily proud of their role in bringing the Atlantic slave trade to an end, despite the enormous cost.  £20 million (the equivalent today of about £300 million) had been incurred paying off slave owners and slave dependent businesses in the 1830’s and the cost of enforcing the prohibition cost the navy further millions.  For an idea of the public mood, see the report on 23 July 1885 in the Times of the proceedings of the Anti-Slavery Society the previous day.  Stanley was the main speaker.

[2] The railway concession was eventually granted to a Belgian company but at Government level, nobody could be convinced that the region had anything to offer.  One American reported to his boss - “General Gordon wrote of the Upper Nile as follows – “the Soudan is a useless possession.  Ever was so and ever will be so…”  Had the brave General Gordon applied these words to the Congo no more condensed or truthful description of the country could have been given than these lines imply” [Sandford Papers (SP)]

[3] Emin was promoted from Bey to Pasha in 1886.  His province was known as Equatoria, but it had no fixed boundaries, covering a huge area roughly where Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) converge on a modern map.  I use “central Africa” synonymously and have indicated the approximate area on Map 3.

[4] Individuals held wildly different views, but none coincided with the Government’s formal position.  The debate can be found in the National Archives [FO881/5433].  The Foreign Office thought that any expedition was too risky and that a large one was impossible due to lack of food en route.  The Prime Minister’s own opinion was that any armed expedition was “quite out of the question” [FO881/5433/11]

[5] IDA.  I refer to the expedition as the “EPRE” and the committee which oversaw it as the “EPRE Committee” or “the committee”.

[6] By far the most authorative book about the EPRE is still “The Emin Pasha Relief Expedition 1886-1890” [1972] by Professor Ian Smith, who was clear about the evidential value of Stanley’s account “Among the deliberate omissions, the veiled references, and the false trails which Stanley made about the expedition when it was all over – and most obviously and assiduously in his book about it – one can occasionally perceive the glint of truth...” [p62].  Smith did not have access to Stanley’s own papers and never grappled with the issue that if Stanley was only ever “occasionally” truthful, how and why he decided which parts of IDA were ever likely to be reliable.  I have taken a lawyer’s approach and have assumed that if it defies logic, nothing Stanley wrote can be assumed to be truthful in the absence of corroboration.

[7] Both quotes from the prefatory letter of dedication addressed to Sir William MacKinnon.

[8] Stanley would never have accepted the criticism, wanting to be seen as a man of the utmost integrity - “All I can boast of is, that I have always held that promise before me as though I carried a banner written “thou shalt keep thy promise.”  (Speech on the eve of the publication of IDA at Holborn Dining Rooms on 26 June 1890)

[9] IDA Vol 1 p31 

[10] IDA Vol 1 p33 – Stanley’s early preference was to take 15 whale boats up the Congo River and cut through a relatively short distance of forest before MacKinnon vetoed the idea.  Stanley remained bitter about it “But it is useless to waste good paper with deploring the inexplicable hostility that MacKinnon and the Committee seemed to have had from the beginning against the all water route” [SA 64]

[11] IDA vol 1 p34 – [11 December 1886 telegram] To be clear, the plan at this stage was to travel through East Africa, not up the Congo.  It is not immediately apparent why MacKinnon should have needed to send a second telegram on 13 December 1886 “Matter quite decided authorities provide ten friends additional ten making amount twenty required all Consular and other assistance specified your letter secured business very urgent and vital importance delay dangerous your urgent assistance return required reply” [SA 1380] since by then Stanley had already confirmed his acceptance and made his plans to get back to England. The “ten and ten” refers to the sums of £10,000 promised by each of the Egyptian Government and MacKinnon’s group of friends.  The investors all ended up paying considerably more.

[12] IDA Vol 1 p35.  The outcome of the discussion at the inaugural EPRE Committee meeting is minuted [MacKinnon papers at SOAS - PPMS1/EPRE/53]. Stanley raised several arguments in support of the Congo route which are to be found in Stanley's archive in the Museum of Africa [SA 64], but one argument, that it would help reduce desertions, was certainly an after-thought. The best way to prevent desertions was always to contract directly with the men (rather than through their slave owners) and treat them properly.  In the event the EPRE suffered more from desertions than any of his earlier expeditions.

[13] IDA Vol 1 p43

[14] Stanley claimed to be entirely mystified why the King had kept him dangling during 1885 and 1886, even after being told that the existence of the State had been at stake.  He came up with his own theory “(the King’s) language was very mysterious but I had the impression it referred to some threat by the French Government who did not desire my presence on the Congo.”   [SA 64 p7]

[15] MacKinnon met with the Foreign Office in mid-November and laid out Stanley’ terms – a complete discretion as to the mode of communicating with Emin and a loose rein plus £20,000 to draw on “He might, if he could conciliate with the King of Uganda, spend much less.  He might want it all…”, and he followed it up with a letter “I have reason to believe that (Stanley) would promptly and unhesitatingly undertake such a service provided the means for doing so were placed at his service…” [FO 881/5433/19 and encs]  Anderson, who headed the African Section of the Foreign Office, decided to give the budget some room for expansion and in his memorandum for the Cabinet, said Stanley would “require control of a maximum of £25,000…” [FO881/5433/23] even though Stanley’s letter to MacKinnon had been explicit – “I venture to promise you that the cost of such a relief expedition would not exceed £20,000…” - less if the Government provided transport.  [FO881/5433/28] At this stage the Congo route was not in prospect and the Government did not want to get involved - even to the limited extent of providing transport.

[16] Pond arranged lecture tours for all the celebrities of the day including Samuel Clements (Mark Twain) and Henry Ward Breacher, a passionate abolitionist, both of whom helped promote Stanley, who was at the time of the EPRE, an American.  At the turn of the century Pond put together a lecture tour for Winston Churchill who found him “a vulgar Yankee impressario” and they fell out.  Pond wrote about his clients (including Stanley, who appears on pages 263 – 288) in his book “Eccentricities of Genius”.

[17] SA 1783

[18] Stanley Falls had been captured by Tippu Tib’s kinsmen at the beginning of 1886 (Werner’s book “A Visit to Stanley’s Rear Column” [1889] gives the story).  Leopold did want to re-establish this station; he did use Stanley to negotiate with Tippu Tib and he did ask Stanley to offer Emin the opportunity to work for his Congo State, which has led historians to assume that Leopold must have had those objects in mind when insisted on the change of route, but Stanley’s own accounts do not support this.

[19] Letter dated 10 November 1885 quoted in Bontinck "L'autobiographie de Hamed ben Mohammed el-Murjebi, Tippo Tip" 1974 [p342]

[20] Bontinck [p361]

[21] 11 December 1886 IDA Vol 1 – p34

[22] Pond - it is dangerous to rely on him for precise dates or details, but this accords with other evidence.

[23] SA 1784 – telegram 24 December 1886. Also, SA1786 – “Will give you direct 40 guineas each for fifty first lectures in Great Britain when you return…” There followed a whole succession of offers, each larger than the one before [SA 1788, SA 1790, SA 1791, SA 1792, SA 1793].

[24] Pond’s recollection is never precise.

[25] Stanley was always trying to sell the idea of opening up the short distance between the Congo and Nile Rivers, for example in his speech on 22 July 1885 to the Anti-Slavery Society [The Times 23 July 1885]

[26] Letter Stanley to Sanford 20 August 1886 (SP/27/ 6)

[27] I am not the first person to make the point – both Smith and Dorothy Middleton (“The Diaries of Arthur Mounteney Jephson” [1968]) made it over 50 years ago. [Smith p67]

[28]Independence Belge [5 December 1886] – “Assuming that all necessary measures can be taken to prepare the way and engage the necessary workforce and that nothing stands in the way of urgency, one can see there is nothing to stop a rapid march and it would be possible in 35 to 40 days – let’s say 2 months at most – for an expedition to cross the distance between Banana and the rapids at Yambuya…” (my translation) Since he was the only European with sufficient knowledge to argue for the Congo route, Stanley was clearly the source of the article, but it was not taken seriously by the British authorities who thought it was quite impractical given recent the Arab capture of Stanley Falls [FO881/5433/50]

[29]FO84/1795 – Anderson reported on this conversation on 24 December 1886.  Stanley put the conversation in the middle of January 1887 to conceal how desperate he was to override MacKinnon’s decision [SA 64]

[30] PPMS1/EPRE/53.  Part (but only part) of his rational for continuing to use Zanzibar as the marshalling point of the expedition, was that Stanley had used East African porters during his time in the service of the Congo State and knew they were cheap.  Porters were far less easy to find on the West coast of Africa after the abolition of slavery but in Zanzibar where it still flourished, were much easier to recruit from their commercially minded slave masters.

[31] If as Stanley suggested, Leopold had bowed to French opposition to his presence on the Congo, it makes no sense that the King would then insist that the expedition travel through the region.

[32] Several authors rely on Stanley’s “journal” [SA 64] as if it was a contemporaneous record in order to fill in the gaps left by IDA, but it is certainly no more reliable.  It was written after the expedition and was as Stanley explained “…a purely private journal, not intended for publication as written down at the time but solely for private use as a reminder of events opinions and expressions…” [page 8]. There are many instances where Stanley demonstrably plays fast and loose with dates, and it is clear from the language used that he was crediting himself with a degree of prescience about events and people which was impossible had he been writing a contemporaneous record.  It may best be viewed as Stanley’s first attempt to articulate a defence for the failures of the EPRE

[33] SA 1382 – [MacKinnon to Stanley 4 January 1887]

[34] SA 1385 – [Mackinnon to Stanley 10 January 1887]. MacKinnon was referring to a letter of 7 January 1887 from Leopold which the Committee discussed on 10 and 11 January 1887 but once again, the facts are opaque.  If it was "impossible" for the King to be deprived of Stanley's services for even 12 months, why did he tell the explorer that he was prepared to postpone his "mission" for 18 months provided the expedition went via the Congo route?  See also memo 5 January 1887 FO881/5617/7 regarding Stanley’s request for Government assistance to get the expedition from Zanzibar to the Congo.

[35] Stanley claimed that the route was not settled and that he was preparing for an expedition which could go by either alternative, but he ignored a rather fundamental logistical challenge.  MacKinnon’s shipping firm had agreed to carry the expedition from the Zanzibar archipelago to mainland Africa – a distance of 20 miles, but when the directors learned that the British Government refused to help with transport and that Stanley expected them to pay the entire cost of taking the expedition around Africa – an additional 5,500 miles - they were stunned. They were still trying to recoup the costs of the exercise long after the expedition was over [see the SA papers relating to Stanley’s litigation against Tippu Tib]

[36] J Rose Troup – “With Stanley’s Rear Column” [1890].  Kenya and Tanzania have rivers, but none are navigable by steamer for any distance.

[37] [SA64]

[38] That Stanley was planning to recruit four times the number of porters he had originally told MacKinnon would be sufficient was something he kept secret, and the full duplicity of Stanley’s dealings with Tippu Tib is laid bare in his journal [SA 64] “I had to explain my method (to the King) at great length.  It was to the effect that we should utilise Tippu Tib until the State was of such strength that we should throw off the mask of compromise and boldly take the offensive… (abiding time) until the time came when we could do away with the system and abolish Tippu Tib and his Arabs at one stroke.

[39] Again, Stanley was playing all sides.  MacKinnon wanted to see Emin join his Imperial British East Africa Company and had specifically instructed Stanley to put an offer to him when they met up.  Leopold put the explorer in an irreconcilable conflict of interest.

[40] Leopold to Strauch 18 December 1886 [Strauch papers (2) in Belgium] The offer did not justify the King’s insistence on the Congo route since it could just as well have been made had Stanley travelled via Lake Victoria.

[41] SA 1800; SA 1801

[42] Stanley preferred to have the certainty of a fixed sum per lecture, but at the same time demanded an ever-increasing share of the box-office which squeezed the organisers and made the lectures uneconomical since English, unlike American audiences, were less willing to pay high ticket prices.

[43] SA 1850

[44] SA 1850

[45] SA 1850 – “there would be considerable difficulty in establishing the contention that the £200 was received by Appleton as a private loan.  Appleton himself would be our only witness and he could not be heard to say this in the face of the receipt which he signed for the money “on account of the within lectures” [Counsel’s advice 6 January 1891]. See also SA 1846 - “I cannot advise you under any circumstances to resist the claim of Mr Pewtress as it is clear that Mr Appleton was your authorised agent and as such had power to receive the money on account” [10 July 1891]

[46] SA 1852 – [9 May 1892]

[47] SA 1846 – correspondence between Stanley and his lawyers concerning the litigation.  Stanley sets out the assertions made by Appleton in a letter to his lawyers “(Appleton continues) There is still another matter which to my surprise appears to have escaped your attention.  In 1886 I introduced Major Pond to you and persuaded him to arrange for a series of 50 lectures to be given by you under his management in America.  Of these only 11 were given at the time.  You duly paid me a commission of 10% as agreed upon these and gave me a solemn assurance that upon your return you would complete the tour “upon the conditions that the fees would be greatly enlarged.  You have my word in this respect” – You have not only given the remaining 39 lectures but many more whereby you and Major Pond two of the three parties to the original agreement have largely and as yet solely profited” [Stanley to lawyers 18 July 1891]

[48] SA 1846 [Stanley to lawyers 18 July 1891]

[49] SA 1857 [Bourchgrave to Stanley 28 June 1893] This is the closest that Leopold got to offereing an explanation - assuming of course that Bourchrave was accurately passing the message on.

[50] A few months after this letter Bourchgrave send a telegram merely confirming that Stanley had been in Belgium on 30 December 1886 which suggests that the lawyers realised that his previous explanation had gone further than was helpful.  De Winton also confirmed that Stanley had travelled to Brussels the previous evening, but neither went so far as to assert that it was Leopold who caused Stanley to return from America, for the straightforward reason that it was just not true. [Leopold to Lambermont 15 December 1886 quoted in Smith p77].

[51] SA 1855 – [Appleton to MacKinnon 17 January 1893]

[52] SA 1855 – [Appleton to MacKinnon 11 July 1893] Sadly MacKinnon had died just 18 days earlier]

[53] SA 1856 – [lawyers’ letter to MacKinnon 23 May 1893] He died a month later.

[54] SA 1846 – contains several letters between Stanley and his lawyers, including that of 31 October 1893 – “I am very sorry you have had so much to pay and personally would have liked to see the case fought out but there is much to be said for Mr Finlay’s view (Finlay was his barrister or “Counsel”).  I think he wished in the first place to save you the annoyance of a prolonged cross examination by a somewhat vulgar Counsel and on the next place he seemed not to trust the jury or feel they would be controlled by the Judge’s ruling.”  Every litigator has said something similar to a losing client]

[55] SA 1846 – letter to Stanley [14 November 1893]

Sources and notes

Bontinck                         François Bontinck: “Aux Origines de l’état indépendant du Congo” [1966]

IDA Vol 1 and 2             HM Stanley: “In Darkest Africa”[1890]

FO/number                    Government papers at the British National Archives inKew

Pond                                 Major Pond: “Eccentricities of Genius” [1907]

PPMS                                MacKinnon papers in SOAS, London

SA number                      Stanley Archive, Museum of Africa, Tervuren, Belgium

Smith                                Professor Smith: “The Emin Pasha Relief Expedition 1886 – 1890” [1972]

SP                                       Sanford papers, Sanford Museum, Florida

Other sources                Given in the notes